来源:原创作品 | 2019-11-28501




Part A

1. How and why did the goals of United States foreign policy change from the end of the First World War (1918) to the end of the Korean War (1953) ?

Document B

Source: Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Sr., speech to the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, August 12, 1919.

Mr. President:

I have never had but one allegiance—I cannot divide it now. I have loved but one flag and I cannot share that devotion and give affection to the mongrel banner invented for a league. Internationalism, illustrated by the Bolshevik . . . is to me repulsive. . . . The United States is the world’s best hope, but if you fetter her in the interests and quarrels of other nations, if you tangle her in the intrigues of Europe, you will destroy her power for good and endanger her very existence. . . . No doubt many excellent and patriotic people see a coming fulfillment of noble ideals in the words “league for peace.” We all respect and share these aspirations and desires, but some of us see no hope, but rather defeat, for them in this murky covenant. For we, too, have our ideals, even if we differ from those who have tried to establish a monopoly of idealism.

Document C

Source: The Washington Treaty, also known as the Five-Power Treaty, signed by the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy, 1922.

The Contracting Powers agree to limit their respective naval armament as provided in the present Treaty. . . . [T]he Contracting Powers shall abandon their respective capital ship building programs, and no new capital ships shall be constructed or acquired by any of the Contracting Powers except replacement tonnage. . . . The total capital ship replacement tonnage of each of the Contracting Powers shall not exceed in standard displacement, for the United States 525,000 tons . . . for the British Empire 525,000 tons . . . for France 175,000 tons . . . for Italy 175,000 tons . . . for Japan 315,000 tons.

Document D

Source: Message from Secretary of State Henry Stimson to the Japanese government after its invasion of Manchuria, January 7, 1932.

[I]n view of the present situation . . . , the American Government deems it to be its duty to notify both the Imperial Japanese Government and the Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot admit the legality of any situation de facto nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those Governments . . . which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or to the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the open door policy; and that it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the . . . obligations of the [Kellogg-Briand] Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, to which Treaty . . . China and Japan, as well as the United States, are parties.

Document E

Source: Senator Gerald P. Nye, speech before the “Keep America Out of War” meeting, New York City, May 27, 1935.

Let us know that it is sales and shipments of munitions and contraband, and the lure of the profits in them, that will get us into another war, and that when the proper time comes and we talk about national honor, let us know that simply means the right to go on making money out of a war. . . . The experience of the last war includes the lesson that neutral rights are not a matter for national protection unless we are prepared to protect them by force. . . . I believe . . . that the only hope of staying out of war is through our people recognizing and declaring as a matter of . . . national policy, that we will not ship munitions to aid combatants and that those of our citizens who ship other materials to belligerent nations must do so at their own risk and without any hope of protection from our Government. If our financiers and industrialists wish to speculate for war profits, let them be warned in advance that they are to be limited to speculation with their own capital and not with the lives of their countrymen and the fabric of their whole nation.

Document F

Source: President Franklin Roosevelt, speech, Chicago, October 5, 1937.

The political situation in the world . . . has been growing progressively worse. . . . The present reign of terror and international lawlessness began a few years ago . . . through unjustified interference in the internal affairs of other nations or the invasion of alien territory in violation of treaties; . . . The peace-loving nations must make a concerted effort in opposition to those violations of treaties and those ignorings of humane instincts which today are creating a state of international anarchy and instability from which there is no escape through mere isolation or neutrality. . . . There can be no stability or peace either within nations or between nations except under laws and moral standards adhered to by all. . . . It seems to be unfortunately true that the epidemic of world lawlessness is spreading. When an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread, the community approves and joins in a quarantine of the patients in order to protect the health of the community against the spread of the disease.

 Document G

Source: Report of a conversation between President Franklin Roosevelt and Marshal Joseph Stalin at the Tehran Conference, 1943.

The President . . . said the question of a post war organization to preserve peace had not been fully explained. . . . There would be a large organization comprised of some 35 members of the United Nations. . . . The President continued that there would be set up an executive committee composed of the Soviet Union, the United States, United Kingdom and China, with two additional European states, one South American, one Near East, one Far Eastern country and one British Dominion. . . . The President then turned to the third organization which he termed “The Four Policemen,” namely, the Soviet Union, United States, Great Britain, and China. This organization would have the power to deal immediately with any threat to the peace and any sudden emergency which requires this action. . . . Marshal Stalin said that he did not think the small nations of Europe would like the organization composed of the Four Policemen. . . . Marshal Stalin pointed out that the world organization suggested by the President, and in particular the Four Policemen, might also require the sending of American troops to Europe. The President pointed out that he had only envisaged the sending of American planes and ships to Europe, and that England and the Soviet Union would have to handlethe land armies in the event of any future threat to the peace.

Document H

Source: United States Secretary of State George C. Marshall, commencement speech at Harvard University, June 5, 1947.

Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist. . . . Any government which maneuvers to block the recovery of other countries cannot expect help from us. Furthermore, governments, political parties, or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit . . . politically or otherwise will encounter the opposition of the United States.

Document I

Source: NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, April 1950.

Our position as the center of power in the free world places a heavy responsibility upon the United States for leadership. We must organize and enlist the energies and resources of the free world in a positive program for peace which will frustrate the Kremlin design for world domination by creating a situation in the free world to which the Kremlin will be compelled to adjust. Without such a cooperative effort, led by the United States, we will have to make gradual withdrawals under pressure until we discover one day that we have sacrificed positions of vital interest. It is imperative that this trend be reversed by a much more rapid and concerted build-up of the actual strength of both the United States and the other nations of the free world. . . . we must, by means of a rapid and sustained build-up of the political, economic, and military strength of the free world, and by means of an affirmative program intended to wrest the initiative from the Soviet Union, confront it with convincing evidence of the determination and ability of the free world to frustrate the Kremlin design of a world dominated by its will.

Document J

Source: General Douglas MacArthur, address to Congress, April 19, 1951.

While I was not consulted prior to the President’s decision to intervene in support of the Republic of Korea, that decision from a military standpoint, proved a sound one. . . . Our victory was complete, and our objectives within reach, when Red China intervened with numerically superior ground forces. This created a new war and an entirely new situation . . . which called for new decisions in the diplomatic sphere to permit the realistic adjustment of military strategy. Such decisions have not been forthcoming. . . . [T]he new situation did urgently demand a drastic revision of strategic planning if our political aim was to defeat this new enemy as we had defeated the old one. . . . War’s very object is victory, not prolonged indecision. In war there can be no substitute for victory.